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1 
Has Nihilism Politicized the Supreme Court  
Nomination Process? 
 
Bruce Ledewitz* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Everyone can see that the Supreme Court nomination 
process has become destructively politicized. There are two 
ideologically cohesive blocs on the Supreme Court and the only 
relevant question has become, in both law and politics, which 
bloc will dominate. The notion of a rule of law binding on all 
does not exist. Judicial qualifications and temperament are ir-
relevant. That is why the Republican-dominated Senate Judici-
ary Committee refused to consider the nomination of Judge 
Merrick Garland and why the so-called “nuclear option” was 
invoked to confirm the nomination of Neil Gorsuch.1 
This is not a phenomenon attributable to only one polit-
ical party. Undoubtedly, the Democrats would have done the 
same if they had had the majority in the Senate.2 
But what has brought us to this state? Sometime in the 
1970s, the American legal profession began to lose its commit-
ment to truth and accepted the view that no binding moral 
judgments can be made. “Accepted the view” is the proper 
 
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. A version of this essay was presented 
at a Symposium at Pepperdine Law School entitled The Supreme Court, Politics and Reform 
on April 8, 2017. My thanks to my research assistants, Francesca Iovino and Joshua Allenberg, 
for their help in the preparation of this essay. 
 1.  On Thursday, April 6, 2017, after Democrats filibustered the nomination of Judge 
Gorsuch, the Republican majority in the Senate removed the filibuster option for Supreme 
Court nominations as it had earlier been removed by a Democratic Party majority for lower 
court nominations and other offices in 2013. See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans De-
ploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to 
Clear Path for Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (April 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/
politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html?_r=0. 
 2.  As indeed they had previously done, in part. See id. 
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term, because it was not a matter of reason or persuasion. It was 
a turn within the culture itself, one that began on the political 
left, but has long since migrated to the right as well. I have de-
scribed this phenomenon—the acceptance that there is no pos-
sibility of a binding moral judgment—as “the arrival of nihil-
ism.”3 Admittedly, this is not an exact philosophical reference.4 
So, let me say it this way: law professors have been teaching 
value skepticism for years and the result is what we have now in 
the Supreme Court nomination process. 
Describing the context as one in which moral judgments 
are understood to be purely subjective actually understates the 
crisis we are in. As the ongoing avalanche of false news in 
American public life illustrates, once you begin to undermine 
the objectivity of values, you end up undermining the reliability 
of facts as well. The death of truth begins with values, but it 
ends up infecting all discourse. 
When realism is surrendered—that is, once it is assumed 
that moral judgments are merely matters of preference without 
“anything remotely like . . . objective reality . . . which [could] 
be ‘discovered’”—then there is nothing but human will upon 
which to base legal judgment.5 At that point, the emergence of 
ideological blocs, like the two currently encompassing all of the 
Justices on the Supreme Court, and the presence of partisan 
support in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary becomes ex-
tremely likely, if not inevitable.  
If that is so, then only the recovery of some form of real-
ism will rescue the Court, the nomination process, and ulti-
mately, American public life from our current morass. The re-
 
 3.  Bruce Ledewitz, The Five Days in June When Values Died in American Law, 49 
AKRON L. REV. 115, 116 (2016). 
 4.  I use the term nihilism to emphasize the root of our skepticism in Nietzsche’s death 
of God. Some would say I am describing relativism rather than nihilism. For a discussion of the 
difference, see CARLO INVERNIZZI ACCETTI, RELATIVISM AND RELIGION: WHY 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES DO NOT NEED MORAL ABSOLUTES 19–20 (2015). 
 5.  CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE IMAGINATION, 37 (1986). 
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covery of some form of realism, therefore, is one of the legal 
profession’s most urgent needs.  
In this essay, I stay very close to materials in law, even 
though what I am attempting to show—the need for realism—
is actually better argued by numerous thinkers outside law.6 
The reason for my choice is not just length, or even my own 
obvious limitations, but rather that I am making a legal point to 
lawyers. We need not be experts in philosophy to see the error 
in our current ways of thinking. I am trying to demonstrate that 
error. 
But before I can make a case for change, the depth of 
the current emergency must be shown. So, we begin below in 
Part II with the loss of truth. 
 
II. THE DEATH OF TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW AND PUBLIC 
LIFE 
 
The question raised here concerning the politicized ju-
dicial nomination process assumes that there is something 
wrong with a politicized Supreme Court. By politicized, I am 
referring to the two ideologically cohesive blocs on the Su-
preme Court that include every Justice, establish general ap-
proaches to constitutional and statutory interpretation, and 
lead, most of the time, to predictable voting patterns in cases of 
importance to the public (e.g., the overturning, or extension, of 
Roe,7 Citizens United,8 Heller,9 Obergefell,10 and a few other 
 
 6.  For example, many of the considerations raised here have been presented in HILARY 
PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2002). 
Aside from not citing philosophical sources, I am skirting important philosophical issues. For 
example, Andre LeDuc has persuasively challenged what he considers to be the foundationalist 
premises of originalism, in the name of anti-foundationalism. See Andre LeDuc, The Anti-
Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over Originalism, 119 
PENN ST. L. REV. 131 (2014). But, if my reading of Justice Scalia here is sound, there are im-
portant anti-foundationlist premises within originalism as well, specifically the subjective source 
of value judgments. And, since I am attributing this understanding of values to all the Justices, 
one could conclude that we are all anti-foundationalists now, which is precisely the problem. 
 7.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 8.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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politically controversial cases and issues). The question also as-
sumes that it is equally bad that Senators, who belong to paral-
lel ideological blocs in the two major political parties, then cre-
ate strategies to promote the size and influence of their bloc’s 
representatives on the Court by blocking nominees to the 
Court or pushing them through. Finally, the question assumes 
that it is something about the Court and its decisions that has 
led to this supposedly negative situation. 
On one level, it is not obvious what is wrong with the 
current situation. Why does it matter if the Justices have al-
ready made up their minds with regard to basic jurisprudential 
issues? The Supreme Court, after all, is not a trial court on 
which one does not want a judge who prejudges the facts of a 
case. Much of the time, the issues before the Supreme Court 
are not sensitive to particular contexts. They are often pure is-
sues of law. So what, then, if there are some Justices who would 
like to overrule Roe or Citizens United for arguably legitimate, 
jurisprudential reasons? They are already committed.  
And if it is legitimate for the Justices already on the 
Court to have these fixed positions, why not judicial nominees? 
For example, Judge Gorsuch’s commitment to originalism as a 
starting point for interpretation of the Constitution is fixed on-
ly in the sense that he has thought about the matter and has 
concluded that this is the best way to interpret the Constitu-
tion.11 On the Supreme Court, he will presumably continue to 
listen to other arguments. He is just not likely to be persuaded 
by them. What is problematic about that? 
And if it is legitimate for a judicial nominee, then why 
not use such matters as a litmus test for a nominee, both by the 
 
 9.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 10.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 11.  See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Judge Gorsuch’s Originalism Contrasts with Mentor’s 
Pragmatism, NPR, http://www.npr.org/2017/02/06/513331261/judge-gorsuch-s-originalism-
philosophy-contrasts-with-mentors-pragmatism (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). See also Judge Gor-
such’s concurrence in Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, infra note 109Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
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president in nomination and by the Senate in confirmation? 
The issues confronting the Court will change over time, but for 
the moment, why not achieve one’s immediate legal goals 
through the selection of Justices, if those goals are not other-
wise illegitimate? Plus, why not embed one’s favored method of 
constitutional interpretation on the Court through a nominee if 
you can? So, why not select and confirm Judge Gorsuch based 
on his prior commitments, or instead choose and confirm Judge 
Garland on the basis of his? That is what happened. 
There is something wrong with this picture of judicial 
decision-making and Senate confirmation, but the problem is 
not within each ideological bloc. It is in their relationship with 
each other. Because each bloc has its own starting point for 
constitutional interpretation and norms for evaluating prior de-
cisions, the whole movement of constitutional law depends on 
which party wins the presidency and the Senate. That is the 
sense in which politics dominates the Supreme Court.  
Of course, there have been watershed moments in the 
history of the Supreme Court—the Revolution of 1937, for ex-
ample—in which political alignment determined the future 
course of the law.12 But the current ideological conflict on the 
Court is set to go on indefinitely. For the foreseeable future, 
fundamental matters will be decided by closely divided votes 
and will be subject to overruling with the next turn of the elec-
toral wheel.13 We have never had a situation like this before and 
 
 12.  The Revolution of 1937 refers primarily to changes in constitutional interpretation 
of the powers of Congress associated with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937) and the unsuccessful Court-packing plan of President Roosevelt, although there were 
also changes in the Court’s interpretation of government regulatory authority under due pro-
cess clauses at around the same time. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Of relevance to the politicization of the nomi-
nation process, G. Edward White “raises the possibility that the constitutional revolution pri-
marily resulted from actuarially driven fortuities in the appointments process,” pointing to the 
fact that “[b]etween 1937 and 1941 Roosevelt had not merely three, but eight appointments to 
the Supreme Court.” G. Edward White, Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal 
in Time 94 MICH. L. REV. 1392, 1408–09 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, 
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF 
ROOSEVELT (1995)). 
 13.  For example, Lee Strang has recently argued that “state courts are not bound by . . . 
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it is not consistent with any sense of a rule of law—indeed, 
there is no law in such ongoing judicial conflict.  
We like to suppose that law is not the same as politics or 
at least not exactly the same as politics. Indeed, many regard 
the distinction of law from politics as the achievement in the 
West of the rule of law.14 We assume that judicial decisions on 
constitutional issues will not just mirror the commitments of 
the two major political parties. In some sense, the courts are 
meant to restrain democratic will, not to replicate it. For exam-
ple, we praise the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld in 2004,15 checking executive branch overreach in the 
prosecution of the war on terror. Or, more recently, we ap-
plaud the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 
deciding, ten to one, that Florida could not punish doctors for 
inquiring about their patients’ gun practices.16 In such cases, we 
expect judges to rule on the law rather than on their political 
alignments. But this requires that there actually be a shared un-
derstanding of law. 
As Steven Smith pointed out years ago in his important 
book, Law’s Quandary, law faces a “quandary” at this point.17 
For, if our modern or post-modern ontology is one of material-
ism, then only a kind of legal positivism is possible that does 
not logically permit criticism of decisions as right or wrong or 
grant the resources to depart from one’s political commitments 
in the name of law.18 Materialism does not allow a claim to 
 
nonoriginalist Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution.” Lee J. Strang, State Court 
Judges Are Not Bound by Nonoriginalist Supreme Court Interpretations, 11 FIU L. REV. 327, 
328 (2016). But this is just making explicit what is implicit for everyone else. How could one 
grant legitimacy to any view other than one’s own if there are no shared interpretive starting 
points? 
 14.  This is so even with regard to a critic such as Roberto Unger, who wrote of the 
emergence in the West of a legal order, “[i]ts rules ought to have a measure of critical inde-
pendence from politics or custom . . .” ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN 
SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY, 80 (1976). 
 15.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 16.  Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 17.  STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2007). 
 18.  “Smith writes that legal elites believe, or imagine they believe, that only material 
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some form of truth about our legal judgments.19 With such an 
ontology, it is not possible to consider a judicial decision with 
which I disagree as genuinely binding on me.  
In other words, everyone is individually acting in good 
faith when trying to enforce the law independently of politics, 
but the overall result is purely political. The direction of law is 
determined altogether by which political coalition prevails in 
the most recent election, as is the case right now as reflected in 
the Supreme Court nomination process.  
Smith’s insight about law links the quandary in the law 
to the quandary in American public life in general. At the deep-
est level, the emergency that confronts us in both contexts is 
about truth, or even the possibility of truth.20 
There is a constant assault on truth in American public 
life today.21 The consequence has been the pervasive feeling 
among the public that “it is all lies.”22 On the one hand, Presi-
dent Trump began to refer to the press as the “fake news me-
dia” and the “enemy of the American people.”23 Undoubtedly, 
 
things are real—particles and forces from a certain view of science—but speak and act as if 
something like justice could be real, as in the injustice of Plessy the day it was decided. Refer-
ences to what the law ‘is’ or what ‘the Constitution’ contains no longer make sense given the 
ontological commitments of at least our legal elites.” Ledewitz, supra note 3, at 154. 
 19.  To be fair, Professor Strang would strenuously deny that he is in any sense a legal 
positivist. See Strang, supra note 13. His reason for denying legitimacy to any Supreme Court 
decisions that do not employ an originalist methodology is that such decisions are not correct 
interpretations of the Constitution. The positivism in his position, however, is implicit. If cruel-
ty, for example, were in some sense real, then a correct interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment would be to ban punishments that are in fact cruel rather than ban punishments that vio-
late the framers’ understanding of cruelty. 
 20.  I suppose that once Time Magazine put on its April 3, 2017 cover the headline “Is 
Truth Dead?” it became easier to see that this is the issue. The crisis of truth is now our new 
conventional wisdom. See TIME, Apr. 3, 2017. 
 21.  On Sunday, March 19, 2017, for example, Charles McGrath argued in the New 
York Times Book Review Section that the Donald Trump Administration treats truth the way 
that Big Brother did in the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 27, and, on the very next page of 
the Book Review, The Great Courses Company ran a full-page ad asking whether Nineteen 
Eighty-Four is still fiction? (book review on file with author). 
 22.  For examples, see Bruce Ledewitz, Is Religion a Non-Negotiable Aspect of Liberal 
Constitutionalism?, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 209 (2017). 
 23.  See Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Calls the News Media the “Enemy of the Peo-
ple,” N.Y. TIMES (February 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/business/trump-
calls-the-news-media-the-enemy-of-the-people.html?_r=0. 
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his supporters believe this. On the other hand, on February 27, 
2017, the New York Times took out an entire page ad to pro-
mote truth, which it claims is under attack, presumably by Pres-
ident Trump.24 Recently, President Trump claimed that the 
Obama administration tapped his phones during the election.25 
I would like to believe that this charge is totally false. But even 
I, a law professor with access to formidable resources, do not 
know what to believe anymore.  
Perhaps the most recent absurd moment of untruth oc-
curred regarding federal employment numbers. On several oc-
casions during the campaign and afterward, President Trump 
referred to the monthly jobs report by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics as “totally fiction.”26 But, when the same report in Febru-
ary 2017 announced a robust addition of 235,000 jobs to the 
economy, he touted it as a great number.27 When confronted 
with this seeming contradiction, Press Secretary Sean Spicer 
did not deny the difference: “I talked to the president prior to 
this, and he said to quote him very clearly: ‘They may have 
been phony in the past, but it’s very real now.’”28 
To be fair to the president, in the past he has criticized 
federal unemployment rate numbers on the reasonable ground 
that the category of unemployed is defined as one actively look-
ing for work; this definition allows the unemployment rate to 
go down when people are so discouraged that they drop out of 
the labor force.29 There is nothing false about that criticism. 
 
 24.  Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2017, at A7. 
 25.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2017, 3:35 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ status/837989835818287106. 
 26.  Christopher Ingraham, 19 Times Trump Called Jobs Numbers ‘Fake’ Before They 
Made Him Look Good, THE WASHINGTON POST: WONKBLOG (September 30, 2017, 1:48 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/10/19-times-trump-called-
the-jobs-numbers-fake-before-they-made-him-look-good/?utm_term=.838041198fb0. 
 27.  See id. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  For example, President Trump stated on September 7, 2012, “Unemployment rate 
only dropped because more people are out of labor force & have stopped looking for work. Not 
a real recovery, phony numbers.” See id. 
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But, in speaking more generally, President Trump has also stat-
ed that such government reports are simply deceptions: “It is a 
phony set of numbers. They cooked the books.”30 The latter 
statement illustrates the world of lies that we live in. 
This world of lies is more than just a reflection of the 
character of Donald Trump—as alarming as that would be 
since he is, after all, President of the United States. During the 
presidential election of 2012, former GE CEO Jack Welch 
made a similar claim that the “jobs numbers” were false: “these 
Chicago guys will do anything . . . can’t debate so change num-
bers.”31 
To a liberal wanting to deny that the problem of untruth 
is a societal one, it would be easy to respond that remarks like 
these are just the rantings of right-wingers.32 But, in the case of 
the jobs reports, the matter does not rest with Twitter. In No-
vember 2013, “New York Post columnist John Crudele pub-
lished an article alleging he had found evidence that the jobs 
report really was cooked.”33 He claimed that a past episode of 
faking results had not been vigorously investigated and that 
sources claimed that leadership at the Labor Department in-
structed surveyors to fake results.34 
The demonstration of our societal rot is not that these 
claims were made, but that they were made and never resolved. 
Peter Ferrara reported on the Forbes Website in November 
2013, that Republicans in Congress were demanding responses 
and that the Obama Administration was challenging the re-
ports, but it was all in the context of political attacks on the 
 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  Jordan Weissmann, Did the Census Bureau Really Fake the Jobs Report, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/did-the-
census-bureau-really-fake-the-jobs-report/281648/. 
 32.  The problem of truth in public life is no longer a matter of one side or the other: 
“Fraudulent news stories, which used to be largely a right-wing phenomenon, are becoming 
increasingly popular among those who oppose the President.” Masha Gessen, The Truth is 
Not a Toy, N.Y. TIMES, SUNDAY REV., March 26, 2017, at 4–5. 
 33.  See Weissmann, supra note 31. 
 34.  Id. 
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Administration: “the lies you were being told during Campaign 
2012.”35 Neither did Democrats insist that the matter be fully 
aired, nor did the Obama Administration worry too much 
about the truth of the matter; the claims of fraud and deception 
simply faded away.  
That is what happens in a society that has lost interest in 
truth. This may have left the public with the impression that 
actual dishonesty is just something that happens, even in official 
government reports. Such an inference is certainly no longer 
unthinkable. Given all this, it was understandable that Charles 
Sykes, former conservative radio talk-show host, wrote in an 
op-ed on February 5, 2017, that “[t]he battle over truth is now 
central to our politics.”36 
However, in reality, the battle over truth was actually 
lost years ago, in various contexts. I have noted elsewhere other 
lies previously told to the American people well before the ad-
vent of President Trump.37 There were lies about the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution in Vietnam, Watergate, Bill Clinton and Mon-
ica Lewinsky, spin in political campaigns in general, big tobac-
co and health effects, Rachel Carson when she published Silent 
Spring, and on and on.  
Perhaps the most prominent lies in politics concern 
global warming. If scientists tell me there is a vast amount of 
liquid water beneath the surface of Europa,38 a moon of Jupiter, 
I just accept it. If I am told there are seven planets circling a 
 
 35.  Peter Ferrara, Did The BLS Give Obama A Major Election 2012 Gift, FORBES, 
November 27, 2013 https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2013/11/27/did-the-bls-give-
obama-a-major-election-2012-gift/#55ef709e583b. Peter Ferrara may not be the most reliable 
source—Forbes Magazine states on its website that “Opinions expressed by Forbes Contribu-
tors are their own”—but the willingness of a major news magazine to be associated with shrill 
invective is itself illustrative of our state today. 
 36.  Charles J. Sykes, Why Nobody Cares the President is Lying, N.Y. TIMES, SUNDAY 
REV., (February 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/opinion/sunday/why-nobody-
cares-the-president-is-lying.html. 
 37.  See Ledewitz, supra note 22. 
 38.  See NASA Report at 
https://www.nasa.gov/topics/solarsystem/features/europa_20111116.html. 
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nearby star,39 I accept it. After all, I am not a scientist. I know 
that I am merely reacting to a scientific consensus and that 
there may be dissenters who ultimately may be proven correct. 
However, none of that affects me because I do not myself know 
anything about these matters. As a non-scientist, I am in no po-
sition to judge. 
But Scott Pruitt, the Administrator of the EPA, is also 
not a scientist. He is a lawyer and a politician. So, when Pruitt 
says that carbon dioxide has not been proven to cause global 
warming,40 against what looks like a very settled scientific con-
sensus the other way, I assume he is lying in order to further 
the interests of powerful corporations and wealthy supporters. 
On the other hand, maybe Pruitt is sincere, and a dishonest ca-
bal of left-wing scientists is duping me. After all, he is a gov-
ernment official. Can he possibly just lie about these things? 
This paralysis is what it means to live in a context without 
truth.  
Where did this acceptance of unreality come from? Alt-
hough beyond my scope here, I believe it has roots in the death 
of God and the resulting practice of ironic post-modernism.41 
As Thomas E. Baker and Jerre S. Williams write in the context 
of postmodern constitutional jurisprudence, “There are no 
foundational principles. There is no such thing as knowledge. 
 
 39.  See Sarah Kaplan, Scientists Discover 7 “Earthlike” Planets Orbiting a Nearby Star, 
THE WASH. POST (February 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-
science/wp/2017/02/22/scientists-discover-seven-earthlike-planets-orbiting-a-nearby-
star/?utm_term=.994c568abe8e. 
 40.  Here was the exchange: “‘Do you believe that it’s been proven that CO2 is the pri-
mary control knob for climate?’ CNBC Anchor Joe Kernen asked Pruitt in a March 9 inter-
view. ‘No, I think that measuring with precision human activity on the climate is something 
very challenging to do and there’s tremendous disagreement about the degree of impact,’ Pruitt 
responded. ‘So no, I would not agree that it’s a primary contributor to the global warming that 
we see.’” Lauren Carroll, EPA Head Scott Pruitt Says Carbon Dioxide is not ‘Primary Con-
tributor’ to Global Warming, POLITIFACT (March 10, 2017), http://www.politifact.com/truth-
o-meter/statements/2017/mar/10/scott-pruitt/epa-head-scott-pruitt-says-carbon-dioxide-not-
prim/. 
 41.  See Ledewitz, supra note 3, at 124. 
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There is no such thing as truth except for the ‘truth’ that there 
is no truth.”42 
However, as Smith also pointed out in Law’s Quandary, 
the problem is not that lawyers disdain truth.43 We readily un-
derstand truth’s intuitive appeal.44 For example, I rarely hear 
people expressly deny the reality of truth. Instead, the problem 
is that everything else we believe renders truth claims incoher-
ent—a form of nonsense. That means that, no matter what we 
say, we cannot practice a rule of law.  
The problem of truth in post-modernity is not going 
away. The criticisms of what Hilary Putnam calls metaphysical 
realism are powerful.45 We cannot do away with those criti-
cisms just because we now suspect that the criticisms may have 
negative consequences.46 So, if we now need to distinguish be-
tween genuine news and false news, between real facts and al-
ternative facts, and between law and politics, we had better be 
clear about our beliefs. Some form of realism, however modest, 
must be recoverable. However, that path will not be easy to 
traverse. We should attempt neither to minimize the depth of 
the emergency we face, nor deny that there are valid reasons for 
this emergency. 
How does the emergency concerning truth lead to the 
politicization of the Supreme Court and the nomination pro-
cess? Surprisingly, the link is through an error. As I will show 
 
 42.  THOMAS E. BAKER & JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A 
NUTSHELL 352–355 (2d. ed. 2003). Postmodern legal thinkers claim the Supreme Court is in-
fluenced by postmodernism and insist “that meaning is not contained in the document, but only 
in the interpreter,” which leads to a crisis of objectivity. It is the consequence of that crisis that 
leads to Justice Scalia’s insistence on reliance on objective factors for interpretation, such as text 
and tradition. See discussion, infra. 
 43.  Ledewitz, supra note 3, at 155. 
 44.  Id. (“[Smith] suggests that most lawyers actually accept the ontology of classical law 
and more or less mouth the skepticism of postmodernity insincerely.”). 
 45.  See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 40–41 (1990). 
 46.  Id. at 37. (Putnam himself saw the danger that criticisms of metaphysical realism 
were leading to the abandonment of the objectivity of ethics: “[a]nd if a rebirth of a full-bodied, 
red-blooded metaphysical realism were the way to get people to accept the objectivity of ethics, 
then I would almost be willing to pay the price of letting that happen.”). 
LEDEWITZ.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:44 PM 
1] Nihilism, Supreme Court Nomination Process 
13 
below, Justice Antonin Scalia—perhaps the most important re-
cent voice in American law—accepted the connection between 
subjectivity and ideology. He agreed that the Supreme Court, 
and the nomination process, had become politicized. Justice 
Scalia concluded that the source of the subjectivity that was un-
dermining the rule of law lay in the non-rationality of value 
judgments. He thought that a certain method of interpretation 
could restore objectivity to law.   
Until we understand the breadth of Justice Scalia’s error, 
aspects of which all the Justices and most of us share, we will 
not be able to set a new course for American law. First, I will 
show in Parts III and IV below that there is no purely meth-
odological path to objectivity in law. Objectivity will have to be 
found elsewhere. Then I will argue in Parts V and VI below, 
that, far from the source of ideological deadlock, values might 
actually lead us out of our hopeless politicization.  
 
III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CLAIM THAT VALUE JUDGMENTS LEAD 
TO POLITICAL CONFLICT 
 
In determining why we are deadlocked in ideological ju-
dicial disagreement, we begin with Justice Antonin Scalia’s clear 
statement. In terms of judicial politicization, Justice Scalia 
warned in dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992, that 
reliance on value judgments by the Supreme Court would lead, 
and was leading, to just the kind of politicization, including 
public protests, that we see in the Garland/Gorsuch affair.47 His 
view is worth quoting at length: 
In truth, I am as distressed as the Court is . . . 
about the “political pressure” directed to the 
Court: the marches, the mail, the protests aimed 
at inducing us to change our opinions. How up-
 
 47.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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setting it is, that so many of our citizens (good 
people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this 
abortion issue, and on various sides of other is-
sues as well) think that we Justices should proper-
ly take into account their views, as though we 
were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law 
but in determining some kind of social consensus. 
The Court would profit, I think, from giving less 
attention to the fact of this distressing phenome-
non, and more attention to the cause of it. That 
cause permeates today’s opinion: a new mode of 
constitutional adjudication that relies not upon 
text and traditional practice to determine the law, 
but upon what the Court calls “reasoned judg-
ment,” which turns out to be nothing but philo-
sophical predilection and moral intuition . . . As 
long as this Court thought (and the people 
thought) that we Justices were doing essentially 
lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discern-
ing our society’s traditional understanding of that 
text—the public pretty much left us alone. Texts 
and traditions are facts to study, not convictions 
to demonstrate about. But if in reality our pro-
cess of constitutional adjudication consists pri-
marily of making value judgments . . . then a free 
and intelligent people’s attitude towards us can 
be expected to be (ought to be) quite different. 
The people know that their value judgments are 
quite as good as those taught in any law school—
maybe better . . . Not only that, but confirmation 
hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into 
question-and-answer sessions in which Senators 
go through a list of their constituents’ most fa-
vored and most disfavored alleged constitutional 
rights, and seek the nominee’s commitment to 
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support or oppose them. Value judgments, after 
all, should be voted on, not dictated; and if our 
Constitution has somehow accidently committed 
them to the Supreme Court, at least we can have 
a sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee to 
that body is put forward.48 
  
Justice Scalia was making two points. First, that rea-
soned judgment “turns out to be” philosophical predilection 
and moral intuition. In turn, philosophical predilection and 
moral intuition amount to nothing more than subjective prefer-
ence, by which I simply mean that, for Justice Scalia, there can-
not be a right or wrong value, even in principle. That is why 
Justice Scalia contrasts value judgments with “facts to study.” 
There would undoubtedly be disagreements about facts to 
study also, but assuming good faith on everyone’s part, there 
would be no point to a letter-writing campaign or a politicized 
Senate hearing to determine what the facts genuinely are. I will 
return in the following sections to this assumption about the 
subjective nature of value judgments. 
Second, Justice Scalia points out that once we are in the 
realm of value judgments, politics and protest are inevitable be-
cause we are engaged in a subjective activity. For Justice Scalia, 
the activity of making value judgments is not really law at all. 
That is why Justice Scalia quotes Justice Curtis’s dissent in 
Dred Scott: 
[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, according to the fixed rules which govern 
the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the 
theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to 
control its meaning, we have no longer a Consti-
tution; we are under the government of individu-
al men, who for the time being have power to de-
 
 48.  Id. at 999–1001. 
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clare what the Constitution is, according to their 
own views of what it ought to mean.49 
 
However, a problem inheres in Justice Scalia’s solution 
to the issue of value judgments. For Justice Scalia, the only way 
out of politics is for law, in particular constitutional law, to con-
sist of something fixed and objective so that the judgments that 
are made will not depend on the preferences of the Justice. If 
that is accomplished, one could almost say it will not matter 
much who Congress confirms as a Justice. We will simply want 
someone who is expert in finding out whatever the evidence is 
of the facts that will determine an outcome. Republicans and 
Democrats might be able to agree on which persons would be 
good at such activities. These persons would then be competent 
judges. Thus, we would have the end of, or at least the reduc-
tion of, politicization. 
Obviously, there are objections that can be raised here. 
Perhaps there will still be value judgments in weighing the fac-
tual evidence, for example. However, I wish to address a deeper 
problem. To accomplish the goal of depoliticization, the meth-
od of interpretation must be accepted as the one right way to 
interpret the Constitution. Unfortunately, however one feels 
about textualism, it is obvious that, at this point, the decision of 
a Justice to interpret the Constitution in accordance with text 
and tradition is not accepted in that way. Instead, the choice to 
adopt this method of interpretation is a value judgment. In-
deed, the supporters of Judge Gorsuch present the matter of in-
terpretation as precisely a kind of plebiscite as to how judges 
should approach the Constitution. Judge Gorsuch should be 
confirmed, his supporters say, because he will interpret the 
Constitution in accordance with text and tradition, while other 
potential nominees—Judge Garland, for example—cannot be 
relied on to do that. 
 
 49.  Id. at 984. 
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Of course, the proponents of text and tradition claim 
that it is the best method of interpretation, even the only meth-
od that really is interpretation, and they give reasons for their 
choice. And they may be right that this methodology is more 
democratically faithful and more objectively predictable than 
any other possibility. Maybe they are even right that there is no 
other method. But, giving reasons does not distinguish this val-
ue judgment from any other. Even if the reasons given are per-
suasive, the decision is still a value judgment. 
My calling textualism a value judgment is not an unfair 
word play. I simply mean that interpreting the Constitution 
that way—by text and tradition—is not set forth in the text of 
the Constitution and is not, or is not wholly, established within 
the tradition. Indeed, so novel is the idea that it is Justice Scal-
ia’s great accomplishment that we now even think of interpreta-
tion in these ways. So, by its own terms, textualism is not the 
only way to interpret the Constitution. It is simply said to be 
the best way to achieve the goal of a rule of law. That is practi-
cally the definition of a value judgment.   
If we now take Justice Scalia’s analysis seriously, it is 
plainly hopeless to expect an end to the politicization of the ju-
dicial confirmation process in the foreseeable future. The Sen-
ate will remain an arena in which a Justice with the “wrong” 
approach to interpretation can be blocked. That is essentially 
what happened to Judge Garland, and would be happening to 
Judge Gorsuch if the Democrats in the Senate had the numbers 
to do it.  
Furthermore, as Justice Scalia also points out, these con-
flicts can never reach a final resolution. Even if one plebiscite is 
held and text and tradition win out, Congress can raise the mat-
ter with the next judicial nomination. And, since the choice of 
interpretive method can be expected to yield fairly consistent 
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results that favor one political side or the other,50 the choice of 
method will always be viewed politically, as indeed it is today.51 
The only way one might alter this depressing scenario 
would be if there were actually something “fixed,” in law, in 
Justice Curtis’s phrase.52 That was Justice Scalia’s hope in 
adopting textualism in the first place—that it would be some-
thing fixed. Unfortunately, even if textualism were understood 
as the only way to interpret, so that choosing it could be re-
garded as fixed, textualism itself would still involve value judg-
ments because textualism is not really a method of interpreta-
tion. 
 
IV. THERE IS NOT LIKELY TO EVER BE AN OBJECTIVE 
METHOD OF INTERPRETATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
I commonly see the phrase “we are all textualists now,”53 
and there is a similar sentiment around originalism.54 For my 
purposes, there is no need to distinguish these two commit-
ments.55 Their acceptance demonstrates a brilliant success for 
Justice Scalia’s life work in a political and rhetorical sense. 
 
 50.  See Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet: McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Limits of 
Progressive Originalism, 19 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J 369, 415 (2010) (“Originalism is not a 
method of constitutional interpretation that can reliably lend itself to progressive outcomes in 
all or even most matters.”) 
 51.  Scott D. Gerber, Liberal Originalism: The Declaration of Independence and Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (Expressing the view that “both 
conservative originalism and the notion of a living constitution . . . are merely post-hoc ration-
alizations for pre-conceived political results.”). 
 52.  See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 999–1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 53.  See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Gorsuch Stands in the Shadow of a Giant, USA TODAY, 
February 13, 2017, at 1A (In the USA Today story about Justice Scalia on the anniversary of his 
death, Justice Elena Kagan is described as frequently saying, in light of Justice Scalia’s legacy, 
“‘we’re all textualists now.’”). 
 54.  See Ho, supra note 50. 
 55.  Indeed, the two descriptions are often conflated. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Re-
member-
ing Bork, SLATE (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispruden
ce/2012/12/robert_bork_s_death_learning_from _him_and_proving_him_wrong.html (reprint-
ed in the YALE LAW REPORT, WINTER 2017, Vol. 64, No. 1, at 19). “Thanks in part to Bork, 
we are all textualists of sorts; we are originalists in part.” Id. 
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These sentiments may even have changed the outer limits of 
what is possible in constitutional interpretation, which, if so, 
would please Justice Scalia. But, for all that, this success has 
nothing to do with a method of constitutional interpretation, as 
that concept is understood in the Casey dissent. And, in Justice 
Scalia’s telling, it is only a method as understood in Casey that 
can depoliticize the Court and the nomination process. 
Justice Scalia’s point in Casey is the need for fixed rules 
of interpretation that will turn interpretation into lawyers’ work 
that will no longer attract public attention because it will be 
seen as an objective investigation unaffected, if done honestly, 
by the values of the investigator. Textualism has gotten no-
where as a method in that sense. 
It is not that a method of interpretation along these lines 
is either alien or unattainable. Science often investigates mat-
ters in this way and one can imagine a department of physics 
selecting a candidate for a tenure position with reference to cer-
tain skills and without regard to the value orientation of the 
candidate. A case like Heller demonstrates something like tex-
tualism and tradition in action, in which the issue of the per-
sonal right of possession of a firearm was resolved largely by 
reference to historical sources.56 By itself, disagreement over 
historical evidence does not refute textualism’s claim to be a 
method of interpretation.  
But to be such a method, textualism would have to be 
clear and complete in its rules of application. Only in that way 
could value judgments be purged from its use and law returned 
to a nonpolitical state. Currently, textualism is neither clear nor 
 
 56.  Judge Posner’s criticism of the quality of the historical work in Heller—he stated in 
a First Amendment discussion that made the Internet that the opinion was “full of historical 
rubbish”—does not detract from the possibility of establishing the use of the method. Perhaps 
it does show that historical approaches should not be adopted because they will not yield clear 
results. But, see Tony Mauro, Judge Posner Slams ‘Stupid’ Decisions Chief Justice Roberts, 
‘Silly’ Stances 
by Scalia, THE NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 30, 2016) http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202773466
396/Judge-Posner-Slams-Stupid-Decisions-by-Chief-Justice-Roberts-Silly-Stances-by-
Scalia?,%20November%2030,%202016.&slreturn=20170904192212. 
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complete and it is hard to imagine the elimination of its meth-
odological flaws, or the elimination of similar flaws in any other 
claimed method of interpretation. 
Starting just from the terms of the method, the lack of 
clarity in textualism is obvious. The addition of tradition to tex-
tualism is not coherent. Textualism is supposed to have some-
thing to do with the original public meaning of some phrase in 
the Constitution.57 That is the matter to be investigated. What 
do the subsequent practices of the 19th and 20th century have to 
do with that? Those later practices might, or might not, reflect 
original public meaning, but tradition has no independent place 
within textualism. Nor was tradition historically a staple of con-
stitutional reasoning. Tradition was a controversial addition to 
constitutional interpretation in Moore v. East Cleveland,58 
where Justice White criticized its merits in his dissent.59 
Tradition’s role in Casey was not inherent in textual 
analysis, but was arbitrary—tradition simply allowed Justice 
Scalia to ward off the claim that, under textualism, the govern-
ment could order couples to have only one child.60 That chal-
lenge was absolutely correct, and Scalia’s refusal to yield to it 
and acknowledge that the Constitution does not cure all ills, 
marks him as not a consistent textualist. That is not a criticism 
of Justice Scalia, as far as I am concerned, but it demonstrates 
 
 57.  According to Randy Barnett, the emphasis on original public meaning was Justice 
Scalia’s most significant contribution (although Barnett used the term originalism, textualism 
could be substituted): [i]n his Taft Lecture, Justice Scalia was perhaps the first defender of 
originalism to shift the theory from its previous focus on the intentions of the framers of the 
Constitution to the original public meaning of the text at the time of its enactment.” Randy E. 
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 
(2006). 
 58.  Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
 59.  “What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable, which of them 
deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable.” Id. at 549. 
 60.  “There is, of course, no comparable tradition barring recognition of a “liberty inter-
est” in carrying one’s child to term free from state efforts to kill it. For that reason, it does not 
follow that the Constitution does not protect childbirth simply because it does not protect 
abortion. The Court’s contention . . . that the only way to protect childbirth is to protect abor-
tion shows the utter bankruptcy of constitutional analysis deprived of tradition as a validating 
factor.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 980, n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
LEDEWITZ.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:44 PM 
1] Nihilism, Supreme Court Nomination Process 
21 
that values count in interpretation—the value, in this instance, 
of parental choice—which defeats the whole point of method.  
The arbitrary results of tradition can be seen in Justice 
Scalia’s offhand invocation of 19th century judicial decisions to 
limit the reach of gun rights in Heller,61 compared to the ab-
sence of such references in Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Citi-
zens United,62 where such decisions likely would have yielded a 
parallel limit on corporate political speech. For that matter, the 
tradition of protecting natural rights in judicial decisions is also 
part of our tradition, going all the way back to Calder v. Bull.63 
So, tradition is just not a self-limiting method.  
Aside from this lack of clarity, textualism is also incom-
plete. That is, no judge always uses textualism. That need not 
defeat textualism as a method, except that there are no fixed 
rules proposed as to when to use textual approaches and when 
to use something else, such as case law in the common law 
sense.64 To take a simple and recent example, Justice Thomas, 
probably the Justice most dedicated to textualism and original-
ism, wrote a majority opinion in Reed v. Gilbert,65 a case strik-
ing down a municipal sign ordinance, which had nothing to do 
with the original public meaning of free speech. The opinion 
simply argued from the familiar First Amendment category of 
content neutrality. 
The reason that resorting to precedent is so important is 
that the purpose of method in Casey is to remove value judg-
ments from judicial decision-making. If the Justices are free to 
 
 61.  “[T]he majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohi-
bitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state ana-
logues.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 62.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 385. 
 63.  See 3 U.S. 386 (1798). Although the actual holding in the case was that the State 
statute in question was not unconstitutional, the exchange between Justice Chase and Justice 
Iredell raised the very issues of natural right and legal positivism that we are still debating. 
 64.  Justice Scalia never hid from his acceptance of precedent in general on pragmatic 
grounds as an exception to his method. See Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead 
Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2009). 
 65.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
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invoke textualism on an ad hoc basis and sometimes follow case 
law instead, there are not the fixed rules of interpretation that 
will depoliticize the nomination process. Hidden values will in-
evitably determine when case law is accepted and when it is to 
be overturned.  
Now there are originalist theorists who recognize this 
point and argue that non-originalist prior decisions lack bind-
ing authority.66 We are far from a consistent form of textualism 
on this matter. 
As I have previously shown, textualism is not normally 
used in areas where the law is settled, the underlying constitu-
tional values are accepted, or even, as in racial affirmative action 
cases, conservative judges simply have a value judgment that 
they prefer to apply over original public meaning.67 In theory, a 
modification to textualism could account for these phenomena, 
but in practice, the attempt would be hopeless. 
Although Neil Gorsuch is known as an originalist,68 it 
was Senator Ted Cruz who succinctly stated at Judge Gorsuch’s 
confirmation hearing69 that judges should interpret law as it is, 
not as it should be.70 But this is to repeat the error of the Ger-
man judges of succumbing to the Nazi slogan, “Gesetz als ge-
setz”—law as law, as highlighted in the Hart-Fuller debate. The 
Nazis promoted this slogan to influence the German judges to 
unreservedly enforce laws that they would likely regard as im-
 
 66.  This point about the illegitimate, nonbinding quality of nonoriginalist decisions is 
what Professor Strang was arguing, supra note 13, in terms of State Judges not following such 
decisions. 
 67.  Ledewitz, supra note 3. 
 68.  See text supra note 3. 
 69.  At about 24:35 in the video for Day 2 of the Confirmation Hearing, Senator Cruz, 
talking about the Federalist Society, states, “[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be.” Sen. Cruz Questions Judge Neil Gor-
such at Confirmation Hearing – March 21, 2017, YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUPmplwZnKE&feature=youtu. But Judge Gorsuch cer-
tainly did not disagree. 
 70.  There is some doubt about whether this is fully Judge Gorsuch’s view. Perhaps 
there was some political posturing at the Confirmation Hearing. See infra note 109. 
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moral.71 Sometimes we need judges to be a moral backstop—to 
hold fast to what the law ought to be. Earl Warren did that in 
Bolling v. Sharpe,72 essentially making up a constitutional text 
to prohibit segregation in the D.C. public schools73 because it 
would be “unthinkable” if the federal government were permit-
ted to practice racial discrimination.74 If Bolling v. Sharpe was a 
proper decision—and no one will publicly question it—then, at 
a minimum, textualism should not always be employed, and 
thus is not a method in the sense of the Casey dissent.  
However, if textualism is not really a method, what does 
the acknowledgment that we are all textualists now mean? Or, 
for that matter, what is the point of the interminable debates 
about interpretive methods? 
These references do not regard textualism as a method, 
but textualism as a value.  Justice Scalia succeeded in convincing 
many people that original public meaning is important. That 
might mean important as a starting point for interpretation, or 
a limit as to what results may be justifiable, or even as a value in 
comparing judicial decisions to other values. This is a consider-
able accomplishment, and I do not denigrate its importance, 
but it is not a rule. It is not fixed. Different judges will use tex-
tual approaches in different ways. Therefore, they will differ in 
judicial outcomes. Thus, as far as Casey is concerned, textual-
ism is just another value judgment that the people and the Sen-
ate can use when evaluating judicial candidates. This would 
probably be true for any other so-called method of interpreta-
tion. Therefore, we are stuck making value judgments, and as 
Justice Scalia foresaw, if value judgments are just preferences, 
 
 71.  See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593, 617 (1958). To be clear, Professor Hart rejected this criticism. 
 72.  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 73.  The federal government is not bound by the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which had been the basis of holding State segregation statutes unconstitu-
tional in Brown. Id. at 499. 
 74.  Id. at 500. 
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we will remain within a highly politicized confirmation context. 
Is there anything to be done about this?   
 
V. ARE VALUE JUDGMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
INHERENTLY DIVISIVE? 
 
Hopefully, at this point I have shown that constitutional 
interpretation, and therefore the nomination process when 
evaluating that interpretation, will inevitably involve value 
judgments.  Justice Scalia was wrong about that, but he was cer-
tainly right that subjective preferences cannot be ignored, and 
will forever remain matters of dispute inconsistent with any-
thing like a rule of law. Does it therefore follow that the nomi-
nation process must remain in the realm of perpetual political 
conflict?  
No. We are not doomed to endless and pointless strife. 
This is because Justice Scalia was also wrong about something 
else. Value judgments are inevitable, but they are not necessari-
ly irrational. The certainty expressed by Justice Scalia that value 
judgments can only reflect subjective preferences, a view that all 
of the Justices on the Supreme Court have shared,75 is itself the 
source of the ideological blocs on the Court, the Senate, and al-
so the unresolvable conflicts and division in our political and 
legal life.   
To see that value judgments are not always divisive, con-
sider two decisions—Brown and Loving—that, in terms of the 
Casey dissent, represent unjustifiable value judgments.  Those 
decisions were grounded in value judgments because they ac-
cepted that the public meaning of the term “equal protection of 
the laws” when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed did not 
include a ban on racial separation in matters like education and 
certainly did not include a ban on anti-miscegenation statutes.   
 
 75.  See generally, Ledewitz, supra note 3. 
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It is irrelevant that historical arguments can be made on 
behalf of Brown,76 and, if it is the case, Loving,77 because any 
fair-minded person would have to admit, as noted originalist 
Robert Bork admitted,78 that they were moral decisions and 
would have been rendered regardless of the historical evidence. 
Chief Justice Warren did not care that he found the historical 
evidence inconclusive in Brown,79 and neither do I, nor do the 
American people. The fact that later historical research con-
cludes that Brown could have been justified on historical 
grounds does not vindicate originalism or textualism.   
Even though Brown and Loving represent value judg-
ments, they are not controversial today. In fact, quite the oppo-
site is true. Any judicial nominee who casts doubt on these cases 
by suggesting that they were not correctly decided, even if they 
should not be reversed, would almost certainly be deemed unfit 
to sit on the Court by the Senate. 
Brown and Loving have always been sufficient to dis-
credit textualism even just as a value in constitutional interpre-
tation.80 The same point could also be made regarding decisions 
protecting women against the gender discriminations of the 
common law.81 These decisions relied on the current, rather 
than the framers’, understanding of equality.   
 
 76.  See Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947 (1995). Professor McConnell does not address Bolling v. Sharpe, where historical 
justification would be harder to find. 
 77.  It is hard to imagine much of a historical case in favor of Loving. The Court ob-
served, undoubtedly correctly, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896) (citing State v. 
Gibson, 36 Indiana, 389), that “[l]aws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races  . . . have 
been universally recognized as within the police power of the State.” 
 78.  In his opening statement at his confirmation hearing, Judge Bork referred to Brown 
as “the greatest moral achievement of our constitutional law.” Nomination of Robert H. Bork 
to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Sen. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 104 (1989) (opening statement of Robert H. Bork, Unit-
ed States Circuit Court Judge for the District of Columbia). 
 79.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., et al., 347 U.S. 483, 489. 
 80.  Brown came up so often in exchanges on constitutional method, that Justice Scalia 
would joke, “Waving the bloody shirt of Brown again, eh?” Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confi-
dence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 54. 
 81.  See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down State law preference for 
males over females to be administrators of estates). 
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Despite the claims of textualism to be democratically 
faithful, the meaning of equal protection in a democratic socie-
ty must reflect what the people currently judge to be equal and 
not only what the framers thought was equality.82 Thus, the liv-
ing constitution tradition is really the only possible interpretive 
stance that American law can take, and conservative jurispru-
dence only survives because it refuses to engage with incon-
sistent case results. For example, conservative jurisprudence will 
never argue that the gender equality cases should be reversed. 
However, this refusal is incoherent. One cannot seriously pro-
pose both that key decisions are currently unassailable and yet 
should not have been rendered in the first place. 
At this point, Justice Scalia might say that at least these 
decisions all rested on a text—equal protection—whereas the 
abortion decisions do not.83 However, this is not accurate, since 
Roe also rested on text—the word liberty in the Fourteenth 
Amendment—in just the same way that these other decisions 
rested on equal protection.   
Nor can one object, even on textualist grounds, to using 
the Due Process Clause in that substantive way. The notion of 
substantive protection through a due process clause was already 
known when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.84 
But there is another decision, quite similar to Brown, 
Loving, and Bolling in its plainly moral value judgment, that 
shows how well accepted value judgments can be—Skinner v. 
 
 82.  This is what Barry Friedman meant when he observed, of the failure of the Court to 
protect women under the Equal Protection Clause, “By the 1960’s, though, the Court’s deci-
sions were running up against reality.” BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 290 (2009). Common words, even in the Constitution, should not be, 
maybe even cannot be, rendered as if they were terms of art. 
 83.  In fact, Justice Scalia did make an argument along these lines in Casey, 505 U.S. at 
980, n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84.  There is disagreement about whether the concept of substantive due process influ-
enced the drafting and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but there is certainly an argu-
ment to be made that it did. See Stefan B. Herpel, Toward a Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil 
Forfeiture in America, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1910, 1940–1943 (1998) (book review). 
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Oklahoma,85 which, in 1942, overturned the Habitual Criminal 
Sterilization Act under the under equal protection doctrine. 
The Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act had allowed the sterili-
zation of certain convicted criminals. Despite the equal protec-
tion invocation, the substantive value judgment underlying the 
case was Justice Douglas’s ringing pronouncement that “[w]e 
are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic 
civil rights of man.”86 
Skinner was a triumph of the American legal system, 
coming in the context of WWII while rejecting Nazi-type eu-
genic claims. The case also repudiated the dark American pro-
gressive eugenics program legitimated in Buck v Bell.87 It is 
frustrating to imagine a Justice Scalia on the Court in 1942 
smugly announcing, “I know the Constitution says nothing 
about the right of reproduction.” Skinner rested precisely on 
“philosophical” rather than “historical . . . premises,” in Mi-
chael McConnell’s phrase, but the case does not “highlight[] 
the pitfalls of constitutional decision making based on such 
premises.”88 
But what then does Skinner highlight? Professor 
McConnell condemned the right of assisted suicide and sought 
to justify his moral/philosophical/religious position in method-
ological terms. What Skinner shows is that method is irrelevant 
to proper constitutional interpretation. It is not the making of 
value judgments that is controversial—philosophical premises 
in McConnell’s terms—but the content of those judgments. 
Therefore, the Court has to be right in its value judgments for 
 
 85.  Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 86.  Id. at 541. 
 87.  274 U.S. 200 (1927). See Eric M. Jaegers, Modern Judicial Treatment of Procrea-
tive Rights of Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal Rights to Procreation and Steriliza-
tion, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 947, 948 (1992) (“The eugenics movement fueled miscon-
ceptions about mentally impaired persons, instilled a desire for social reform and paved the way 
to Justice Holmes’ decision in Buck v. Bell.”). 
 88.  Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 
UTAH L. REV. 665, 685. 
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those value judgments to become settled law.  However, that 
shows there is such a thing as being right. Which, in turn shows 
that value judgments can have justifiable content and are not 
simply subjective preferences. 
What is that content? Charles Black and Justice Harlan 
referred to public acceptance as the measure of successful judi-
cial decision-making.89 But, as I think Black’s formulation im-
plies—“Constitutional doctrine succeeds if it expresses what 
turns out to be at last the authentic impulses of the nation”90—
public acceptance is not a matter of public opinion per se, but 
public opinion tending to make defensible moral judgments. 
Thus, the proper test of a judicial value judgment is that it be a 
good judgment. 
I concede that this is hopeless as a method of interpreta-
tion. Justice Douglas’ view in Skinner was nothing more than 
the same kind of moral intuition that Justice Scalia ridiculed in 
his Casey dissent. Nonetheless, Skinner will be celebrated in 
American legal history when all our current disputes about in-
terpretation have fallen into the dust. Moral intuition is binding 
when it is right. 
This point is not just a matter of ancient judicial history. 
For all the efforts of Chief Justice Rehnquist to reject substan-
tive due process, he was forced to admit in Washington v. 
Glucksberg91 that the earlier Cruzan decision had established 
the right of a “competent person” to “‘refuse lifesaving hydra-
tion and nutrition’”92 even though one would have to say that 
the Constitution says nothing about that matter. No out-of-
 
 89.  For Justice Harlan’s approach, see Bruce Ledewitz, Justice Harlan’s Law and De-
mocracy, 20 J.L. & POL. 373, 374 (2004) (“Justice John M. Harlan gave a partial answer to the 
question of the relationship of law and democracy in his well-known dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 
In a few memorable sentences, Justice Harlan suggested that the courts are subject to a form of 
democratic correction. Judicial decisions outside the national tradition do not survive. Justice 
Harlan was conceptualizing democracy in this quotation as an organic, ongoing, informal, and 
bottom-up phenomenon.”). 
 90.  CHARLES BLACK, THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 149 (1986). 
 91.  Wash v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 92.  Id. at 723 (emphasis added). 
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control pro-life State is going to be permitted to insist that per-
sons remain alive as martyrs to its value judgment about life, 
not because States cannot make value judgments, but because 
this value judgment would be wrong in the context of its being 
imposed on an unwilling person. 
Even in the highly contested realm of gay rights, Law-
rence v. Texas,93 which barred the criminalization of consensual 
gay sex, was a necessary and good decision, which has since be-
come completely accepted, because it ended the sporadic har-
assment of gay American citizens. It is very troubling that Jus-
tice Scalia’s approach to interpretation obscured his moral 
sense at that point. 
Additionally, Obergefell—which represented precisely 
the kind of judicial overreach that supports conservative juris-
prudence’s commitment to history and tradition—is not partic-
ularly controversial in and of itself. I doubt that a judicial nom-
inee who pledged openly to overturn it would be confirmed as a 
Supreme Court Justice. Obergefell is controversial because of 
its effect on religious liberty. If supporters of same-sex marriage 
were to acknowledge that they have won, that they will not 
challenge the tax-exempt status of religious institutions who 
oppose same-sex unions, and will leave the occasional dissent-
ing florist alone, the remaining deep-seated religious opposi-
tion would die out.  This opposition would literally die out be-
cause even among young religious believers there are many 
who support gay marriage.”94 Therefore, the entire controversy 
over Obergefell would simply end. Thus, value judgments 
made by the Supreme Court do not cause the Court’s politici-
zation, the nomination process, or the ideological blocs on the 
Court.  Value judgments are not always divisive.   
 
 93.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 94. See Ryan Denison, Why 47% of younger evangelicals support gay marriage, 
DENISON FORUM ON TRUTH AND CULTURE (Jun. 27, 2017), 
https://www.denisonforum.org/uncategorized/47-younger-evangelicals-support-gay-marriage/ 
LEDEWITZ .MACRO. 1. LEDEWITZ.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:44 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 32 
30 
What then is the cause of the current partisan deadlock? 
We don’t study value judgments, or debate with each other 
about them, because of our certainty that there is nothing to 
study and no way to have a real debate about values. Therefore, 
we feel justified in simply lining up in blocs according to our 
preexisting values. In other words, the fact/value distinction 
bewitches us. But our nihilism in this regard is just an assump-
tion. Perhaps it is even false.  
 
 
 
 
VI. CONSIDERING WHETHER VALUE JUDGMENTS CAN BE 
DETERMINED 
 
I had thought to call this section, “Can Value Judgments 
be Determined?” but I realized that law is a long way from be-
ing able to answer that question. For the moment, it would be 
sufficient if we recognized that law behaves as if value judg-
ments cannot be determined, and that there are negative conse-
quences following that assumption. That recognition might 
then spur us to take the determination question of determina-
tion. 
Justice Scalia began his Casey dissent with the value 
judgment that he rightly concluded to be at the heart of the 
abortion controversy—the humanity of the unborn child. In 
criticizing the use of “reasoned judgment” to decide the abor-
tion issue, Justice Scalia pointed out that “‘reasoned judgment’ 
does not begin by begging the question, as Roe and subsequent 
cases unquestionably did in assuming that what the State is pro-
tecting is the mere ‘potentiality of human life.’”95 According to 
Justice Scalia, “the proper criteria [are] text and tradition,”96 
 
 95.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 96.  Id. at 983. 
LEDEWITZ.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:44 PM 
1] Nihilism, Supreme Court Nomination Process 
31 
when interpreting the Constitution, not reasoned judgment. 
However, reasoned judgment must deal with the fundamental 
matter to be resolved. In what seems to me the heart of Justice 
Scalia’s legal method in all of his writings, he then both names 
the issue in the abortion controversy and generally describes 
the absolute limit of law that his method of interpretation is 
meant to acknowledge and enforce: 
The whole argument of abortion opponents is 
that what the Court calls the fetus and what oth-
ers call the unborn child is a human life. Thus, 
whatever answer Roe came up with after con-
ducting its “balancing” is bound to be wrong, un-
less it is correct that the human fetus is in some 
critical sense merely potentially human. There is 
of course no way to determine that as a legal mat-
ter; it is in fact a value judgment. Some societies 
have considered newborn children not yet hu-
man, or the incompetent elderly no longer so.97 
 
Because the thinking and commitments contained in this 
well-known passage98 represent the commitment of a large por-
tion of the legal academy, many judges (including Judge Gor-
such), an entire political party, and, increasingly, the dominant 
view of law in the public, it is worth reminding readers how 
odd, ridiculous, and immoral this passage is. This is especially 
important since Justice Scalia thought it was obvious—hence 
the phrase, “of course”—that law could not determine whether 
a fetus is a human life. That is, it was so obvious that nothing 
rational could be said about value judgments that Justice Scalia 
did not think it necessary to defend this assumption. 
 
 97.  Id. at 982. 
 98.  I performed a Westlaw search for the first five words and found the passage quoted 
in fourteen law review articles, and, considering its presence in every constitutional law text-
book I have ever seen, it can be reasonably assumed that every American law student since 1992 
has probably at least read it. 
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The passage is odd because the Constitution plainly 
charges courts to protect “life” in the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth99 and Fourteenth100 Amendments. Note that I am not 
claiming here that the protection of life is supposed to be sub-
stantive (despite believing that myself). But even if due process 
is merely procedural, courts are supposed to protect life from 
being taken by any government without due process of law. 
This responsibility is put to the courts in the plainest textual 
way. It is odd that a supposed textualist like Justice Scalia pro-
poses that law walk away from this responsibility, which neces-
sarily requires deciding whether someone or something is a life. 
What would Justice Scalia have said if someone had proposed 
that it is too difficult to decide what “property” is and therefore 
courts should stop trying to protect that? 
The passage is ridiculous because it assumes that just be-
cause there is disagreement about a matter, nothing further can 
be said about it. But, why is it significant that some societies 
have “considered newborn children not yet human”? Some so-
cieties have believed that the world is flat. Does Justice Scalia 
consider mere disagreement sufficient to remove that matter al-
so from the realm of things that can be determined, even de-
termined by law?  
Now it may be that values are different from facts, but 
that difference cannot reside in the notion that people disagree 
about values but not about facts. People disagree about both. As 
Hilary Putnam put it, “[n]o sane person should believe that 
something is ‘subjective’ merely because it cannot be settled be-
yond controversy.”101 
The passage is immoral for reasons, I hope, everyone 
can immediately appreciate. The thinking here represents the 
 
 99.  U.S. CONST. amend. V: “[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. . . .” 
 100.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law. . . .” 
 101.  HILARY PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 71 (1987). 
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crudest cultural relativism, which holds that no cross-cultural 
criticisms can be made because moral judgments in different 
cultures are incommensurate. Thus, there are no universal, 
binding moral truths.102 
We may not know much about value judgments, includ-
ing what to do about abortion. But surely we know, as well as 
we know the earth circles the sun, that cultures that exposed 
unwanted infants to death or killed the incompetent elderly 
were committing immoral acts. How could anyone, let alone a 
Justice on the Supreme Court, suggest that since we cannot 
know whether these practices are wrong, we cannot know 
whether the fetus is a human being? The argument should have 
gone the other way. Since we do know that these other practic-
es are wrong, we should be able to determine whether the fetus 
is human by an extension of moral reasoning. 
It is not even clear that the humanity of the fetus is a 
value judgment, in Justice Scalia’s terms. The facts of fetal de-
velopment are not in dispute. A unique set of chromosome 
pairs comes into existence in the act of fertilization.103 There is 
not any doubt that a human being’s existence can be traced to 
that point, and not before. Everything after fertilization is de-
velopment. 
A value judgment does arise, but only at the point of de-
ciding the significance of human life in the womb, not whether 
there is something human there. I do not dispute that this value 
judgment is very difficult to make for many reasons, not least of 
 
 102.  We see a cultural relativism similar to that of Justice Scalia in the offhand refusal of 
Donald Trump to condemn the brutal regime of Vladimir Putin during the 2016 presidential 
campaign: “‘It’s a very different system, and I don’t happen to like the system, but certainly in 
that system, he’s been a leader. Far more than our president has been a leader.’” Andrew 
Rosenthal, Opin-
ion, What Trump Supporters Want You to Believe, N.Y. Times (Sept. 13, 2016), https://nyti.
ms/2InJpcQ (quoting 2016 presidential candidate Donald J. Trump at a campaign town hall 
meeting). Mr. Rosenthal called Trump’s comment “[m]oral relativism in its most base form.” 
Id. Since one cannot judge between democracy and autocracy, this kind of relativism under-
mines the entire constitutional fabric. 
 103.  See Dianne N. Irving, When Do Human Beings Begin?: Scientific Myths and Sci-
entific Facts, 19 INT’L J. SOC. &SOC. POL’Y, no. 3/4, 1999, at 22, 22–36. 
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which is the overwhelming presence of sex discrimination in 
this society, which places the responsibility for an unwanted 
baby not only mostly, but for all practical purposes, solely upon 
the mother and not the father.104 Nonetheless, why should it 
follow from this difficulty that law can determine nothing about 
the matter? And even more to the point, why should the diffi-
culty of this judgment infect all reasoned judgment about all 
values? 
In placing his method of interpretation upon an episte-
mological ground—the impossibility of knowledge about value 
judgments—rather than upon the difficulty of making correct 
moral judgments about abortion, Justice Scalia made a fateful, 
damaging choice in the direction of relativism and nihilism. I 
do not mean that Justice Scalia’s dissent caused the current 
American descent into untruth that is going on all around us. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent is merely a small part of that overall soci-
etal movement, and not its genesis. But, it is a part, and given 
the role of the Supreme Court in American life, it is hard to say 
that it was insignificant.  
It was certainly not insignificant in law. As Justice Scalia 
notes, but fails to appreciate, the majority in Roe agreed with 
him that the question of when human life begins could not be 
decided.105 What could be decided by the majority was, first, 
that the Constitution does not define the fetus as a person106—a 
purely textual judgment entirely in accordance with Justice 
Scalia’s public-meaning approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion. Second, the majority could decide that Texas’s claim that 
 
 104.  The noted feminist thinker Catharine MacKinnon was thinking along similar lines 
years ago—that “[t]he fetus is a human form of life,” but “[t]he existence of sex inequality in 
society requires that completed birth mark the personhood line.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1316 (1991). 
 105.  “We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained 
in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any 
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a posi-
tion to speculate as to the answer.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
 106.  Id. at 157–58. 
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the fetus was a human being was merely “one theory of life,”107 
which, again, is entirely consistent with Justice Scalia’s under-
standing of the subjective nature of value judgments.  
Using this approach, the only issue for the Court in Roe 
should have been whether the State has unlimited power to 
forbid a medical operation that a doctor judges to be warranted 
based on that State’s disputed moral theory. Justice Scalia 
would argue, I suppose, that the State has that power, but even 
the Cruzan decision seems to challenge that conclusion. Aside 
from that issue, if value judgments are mere opinions, as Justice 
Scalia insists, it would seem that Roe was correctly decided.  
Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s view of value judgments was 
adopted by the majority in Lawrence in a context that Justice 
Scalia rejected. The majority in Lawrence formally adopted the 
view that the moral judgment of a majority is not a sufficient 
basis by itself to uphold a law.108 That is, under the current doc-
trines, a moral judgment could not serve as a rational basis for a 
law. Justice Scalia objected to this holding, even though it fol-
lows from the position in his Casey dissent. 
Judge Gorsuch unintentionally demonstrated the futility 
of Justice Scalia’s position when he observed in a concurrence, 
in a formulation often repeated in evaluating his fitness for the 
Supreme Court, that “[the Constitution] isn’t some inkblot.”109 
But the inkblot test in psychotherapy is meant to capture non-
rational aspects of human personality. Thus, Judge Gorsuch’s 
choice of image is entirely in keeping with Justice Scalia’s value 
skepticism that there can be nothing rational about values.110 
 
 107.  Id. at 162. 
 108.  “[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particu-
lar practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice. . . 
.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)). 
 109.  Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 661 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring): “And that document isn’t some inkblot on which litigants may project their hopes 
and dreams for a new and perfected tort law, but a carefully drafted text judges are charged with 
applying according to its original public meaning.” 
 110.  There is reason to doubt that Judge Gorsuch actually agrees with the value skepti-
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But, what if the opposite is the case? What if the Consti-
tution is not an inkblot, not because the Constitution can only 
be interpreted textually and historically, but because constitu-
tional interpretation is, or could be, something rational even 
when values are plainly present? What if something can actually 
be learned about value judgments and reasoned judgment 
thereby improved? In other words, what would be the implica-
tions for law if values are not merely subjective preference? 
 
VII. JUDICIAL POLITICS IN AN AGE OF RATIONAL VALUE 
JUDGMENTS 
 
I began with an observation and a problem. The obser-
vation was that the Supreme Court nomination process has be-
come politicized. The problem is that the understanding of val-
ues as preferences, which currently dominates American 
political and legal life, leads to the formation of ideological 
blocs on the Court and in the Senate that control evaluation of 
judicial nominees and remove the necessary foundation for a 
rule of law. 
What would happen if a nominee to the Supreme Court 
approached the Senate Judiciary Committee with a different 
kind of message? What if a nominee began with the following 
statement? 
I come before you today wanting to plainly indi-
cate my understanding of how constitutional 
questions should be approached so that the 
committee can freely evaluate my fitness to be 
confirmed as a Justice on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The Constitution enacts both a structure 
 
cism demonstrated by Justice Scalia, despite the inkblot reference. Judge Gorsuch contributed a 
chapter to a book on John Finnis, in which he states that, although not “[m]y daily bread . . . 
from time to time, Finnis has been kind enough to dine with those of us who subsist on. . . doc-
trinal fare. . . .” Neil M. Gorsuch, Intention and the Allocation of Risk, in REASON, MORALITY, 
AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS 413 (John Keown & Robert P. George eds., 
2013). Certainly that does not sound like the remark of a genuine legal positivist. 
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of government and the protection of specified 
and unspecified rights. All of the Constitution 
should be interpreted as a unified and rational 
whole so that structure and rights harmonize. In 
understanding rights, in particular, attention 
must be given both to what the framers enacted 
in the immediate context and in the long run. In 
the immediate context, their judgment is binding. 
But in the long run, as they themselves would 
agree, our judgments must govern. So, for exam-
ple, if the phrase, “cruel and unusual punish-
ments” was understood to bar the imposition of 
certain corporal punishments when the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted, I agree with textualists 
and originalists that these punishments are forev-
er barred. But, as to the meaning of cruelty itself, 
that must be approached from a current under-
standing of cruelty. Otherwise, the Constitution 
would become a term of art rather than an ongo-
ing source of political legitimacy. Although the 
application of this approach is very difficult in the 
context of unenumerated rights, it is plain that 
the framers understood that such rights exist and 
have charged the future with their recognition. 
As to the criticism that my approach will leave 
the meaning of the Constitution in the hands of 
judges, I can only respond along the lines of Jus-
tice Harlan defending substantive due process in 
Griswold v. Connecticut. Justice Harlan’s respect 
for history and tradition did not prevent him 
from recognizing the right of marital privacy as 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” I 
would wish as a Justice to be worthy of the tradi-
tion of ordered liberty notwithstanding the par-
ticular views of the past, and I would hope that 
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my judgments would be vindicated by the people. 
Otherwise, I expect that my judgments would be 
overturned in time. 
 
We can be pretty sure that the reaction to such a state-
ment would be one of disbelief and suspicion. We can be pretty 
sure that the nominee would be criticized as having given up 
the principle of “interpretive fidelity” to the Constitution and 
wanting to substitute instead “the abstract theorizing of federal 
judges.”111 In addition, the nominee would be accused of al-
ready having decided some of the most controversial decisions 
that will come before the Court, and of trying to obscure that 
fact by falsely claiming to be practicing an open and rational 
method. 
But, we do not have to speculate. There already has 
been an example of this type of a reaction to such a claim—the 
reaction to Justice Clarence Thomas before and during his 
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1991. Dur-
ing those hearings, the controversy over Justice Thomas’s natu-
ral law orientation—considered a front for a conservative judi-
cial and political agenda—was so intense that the nominee 
assuaged concerns by essentially abandoning his previous juris-
prudential thinking by saying, “[I] don’t see a role for the use of 
natural law in constitutional adjudication.”112 
There is a lesson in this thought experiment. There is 
no immediate way of alleviating the political divisions on the 
Supreme Court and in the Senate confirmation process. Ap-
peals to reason, appeals to the candidate’s moderation (such as 
in the case of Judge Garland), and claims to be only following 
 
 111.  See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A 
Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1269, 1285, 1287 (1997). 
 112.  See generally David Margolick, The Thomas Hearings; Sizing Up the Talk of ‘Nat-
ural Law’: Many Ideologies Discover a Precept, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/12/us/thomas-hearings-sizing-up-talk-natural-law-many-
ideologies-discover-precept.html?pagewanted=all. 
LEDEWITZ.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:44 PM 
1] Nihilism, Supreme Court Nomination Process 
39 
the law and not pursuing any agenda (such as in the case of 
Judge Gorsuch), are not helpful when participants in the hear-
ings think they “know” that only human will, and not judg-
ment, is present.  
Essentially, the only thing that matters to the partici-
pants is whether cases like Roe will be overruled or extended. 
And the only reason these concerns did not derail the nomina-
tions of Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan113 is that 
they were felt to be replacing equally liberal Justices, and there-
fore they would not alter the Court’s basic direction and orien-
tation. However, Judge Garland was nominated to replace a 
conservative Justice, which would have altered the future direc-
tion of the Court. So, at that point, Republicans considered any 
action against him justified. In fact, it is likely that if Hillary 
Clinton had been elected president, none of her nominees to 
the Court would have been confirmed by the Republican Sen-
ate.114 The Court would have been allowed to shrink in a kind 
of reverse court-packing plan.   
The same partisan opposition will occur if President 
Trump attempts to replace Justice Kennedy. It will be under-
stood that anyone so nominated will have made a commitment, 
if not expressly, then impliedly, to overrule Roe. This could 
lead to the dirtiest nomination fight in memory, if not in histo-
ry, which, considering the recent Garland and Gorsuch nomi-
nations, is saying something. 
Certainly this situation is bad for the Supreme Court, 
bad for law, and bad for American political life. The question is, 
can anything be done about it? If, at this point, nothing can be 
done in the courts or in the Senate, does that mean that ulti-
mately nothing can be done at all? Here, there is some poten-
tial hope. The reason law is so beset is that law has decided that 
human will is the fundamental reality in all decision making. All 
 
 113.  Neither nomination was opposed by filibuster. 
 114.  See Ledewitz, supra note 22, at 237 & n.161. 
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claims currently offered about interpretation are ultimately 
ways to deal with that conclusion. 
On the other hand, if it were possible for law to have a 
genuine subject matter and not simply reflect a contest for 
power, then it might be possible to evaluate legal methods and 
conclusions with criteria beyond whether the outcomes are pre-
ferred by various political coalitions. That search would have to 
begin in law school. 
 
VIII. LAW SCHOOL IN AN AGE OF RATIONAL VALUE 
JUDGMENTS 
 
What if the good were real? And what if law’s contribu-
tion to the good could be studied? This idea is not a fantasy, 
even though it is hard to imagine in the current positivistic con-
text. In other words, how can moral realism, and a kind of ex-
pansive and qualitative empiricism, be introduced into the law 
school curriculum?  
The reason to proceed along these lines is that nonparti-
sanship and reasoned judgment are not character traits. We 
may wish that people in political life were more civil to each 
other, but the cause of incivility is not simply that people today 
are more aggressive or less polite than they used to be. People 
may indeed be more aggressive and less polite, but it is because 
of the understanding of values that so influenced Justice Scalia. 
To put it simply, if reasoned judgment is always a fraudulent 
cover for human will—that is, if David Hume was right about 
reason as the slave of the passions115—then there will not be any 
reasoned judgment because any such pretense of judgment 
would be a fraud. And law school therefore will not teach rea-
soned judgment, as indeed it does not today. But, if there were 
 
 115.  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 415 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1888): “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” 
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actually something to reason from and about, then people could 
engage productively in reason, and law school could then be the 
place where reasoning about humans flourishing in community 
would take place.  
We have a model for disagreements within a context of 
reason—namely, the debates over the enactment of the Consti-
tution. Those disagreements were vehement. But they took 
place within a shared culture of understanding. We have to 
begin to recreate a culture like that, something that could be 
done in law school. 
But how? I will be the first to admit that I do not know 
the full answer to that question. That is why this section will be 
a short one. Nevertheless, we can proceed, both negatively and 
positively, to at least outline what such a law school of the fu-
ture might be like.  
As to what matters do not need attention, or are at least 
irrelevant to the emergency of public life, we have skills learn-
ing and general improvements in law school teaching. I doubt 
that there was anything here that needed to be fixed—after all, 
the downturn in law school applications had to do with macro-
economic conditions rather than a perceived problem with law 
school instruction. But whatever worth these efforts have, they 
miss the mark as to today’s genuine issue, which is not skills or 
information, but the crisis in values and meaning.  
It is ironic that the authorities who oversee law 
schools—the AALS and the ABA—have concerns about these 
irrelevant matters, but no apparent concern over the condition 
of American public life in general and the rule of law in particu-
lar. The ABA touts pedagogical issues, while the AALS tried to 
remind the public at its 2017 annual meeting Why Law Mat-
ters.116 There is a crisis in America over the rule of law, but the 
 
 116.  See generally Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools in the 
Renewal of American Democracy, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 230, 256–59 (2017). 
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crisis is not in the public; it is within the legal academy and the 
courts. Physician, heal thyself. 
The other matter that is not needed in law schools is 
relevance to the legal issues of the day. Law school cannot 
begin with the big controversial cases like Roe and how they 
should be decided. A thorough, nonideological foundation 
would have to be laid first, or all such conclusions would be 
dismissed as mere partisanship. That also means that law pro-
fessors have to be law professors, rather than junior judges ar-
guing for their side in the latest media reported controversies. 
There is also already a well-established starting point for 
loose communities of religious and non-religious people to 
work together to arrest just the sort of cognitive decline—the 
bias and social irrationality—that we are now experiencing. 
Bernard Lonergan, a Jesuit theologian, called such a loose 
community “Cosmopolis,” which Mark Miller describes as “a 
redemptive community that would motivate people on a cultur-
al level instead of attempting through economics or politics to 
impose new social structures.”117 That last point about not 
working programmatically is important, because it would be 
premature to weigh in on those political matters in law school, 
which law professors, and I most certainly include myself, love 
to do. 
But then what should be the starting point for legal edu-
cation? We have to start where the crisis is. So, in terms of the 
kind of realism that confronts value skepticism, the question is 
not yet the content of the real, but the presence of the real. 
That is, do values have any kind of participation in the real—is 
the good in any sense really there? Or, to put it simply, when I 
write on the board, “Slavery is wrong,” am I writing nonsense? 
Is, or is not, the fair response to what I have written, “Well, 
wrong now for us, but not wrong then for them”? For the sake 
 
 117.  MARK T. MILLER, THE QUEST FOR GOD & THE GOOD LIFE: LONERGAN’S 
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 177–78 (2013). 
LEDEWITZ.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:44 PM 
1] Nihilism, Supreme Court Nomination Process 
43 
of my students, I have to try to answer that question—not only 
about slavery, but about any such judgment.118 
Internal realism and realism with a human face—forms 
of at least minimal realism—were the lifelong preoccupation of 
the American analytic philosopher, Hilary Putnam,119who 
passed away in 2016. Putnam was very close to law during his 
career,120 and, even if we law professors cannot read Heidegger 
and Hegel, there is no excuse for not reading Putnam. Putnam 
is where I, at least, propose to start. Others will have differing 
starting points.   
But if we cannot be united on starting points, we must 
be clear about the goal. The goal is to put law on something 
akin to scientific foundations. We want to study human flour-
ishing in communities, and the sciences can teach us a great 
deal about that; but so can the humanities. Recently, law has 
developed an arrogance about looking to outside sources such 
as these—an arrogance that the legal realists, for example, did 
not share. They did not hesitate to look to science, in particular 
psychology, for insights into law.121 
I have to add two warnings here. First, law did begin 
having debates like these in the 1980s among Judge Richard 
Posner, Owen Fiss, Stanley Fish, and others.122 These debates 
did not go very far or lead to anything. I think Putnam might 
say the debates were handicapped by an unreasonable standard 
 
 118.  Our position, in other words, has to resemble that attributed to C.S. Lewis: rather 
than offer a “final worked-out ethical theory . . . [h]e offered a defense of moral reality itself.” 
JUSTIN BUCKLEY DYER & MICAH J. WATSON, C.S. LEWIS ON POLITICS AND THE NATURAL 
LAW 37 (2016). 
 119.  Putnam suggested that he gave up this effort after the 1980s. See Hilary Putnam, 
Pragmatism and Realism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 153, 162–63 (1996). But it is clear even from 
the article itself that the effort was not given up, but only one of his approaches to realism—the 
approach that Putnam called “internal realism.” 
 120.  Putnam even used the metaphor of adjudication for how to engage ethical judgment 
in general. See PUTNAM, supra note 45, at 181. 
 121.  See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
 122.  In the midst of it, Martha Minow called it “the interpretive turn.” Martha Minow, 
Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L. J. 1860, 1861 (1987). 
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for realism—or objectivity, as it was called.123 I would add that 
there was also a fear of religion and an unwillingness to truly 
explore the possibility of truth in the cosmos, a concern that 
our more environmentally concerned and scientifically sensitive 
age might not share. Anyway, we have to try again.  
But the second warning is a methodological point—the 
debate was allowed to die off. This time, whatever searching 
there is will have to be pushed all the way toward what Martin 
Heidegger characterized as decision.124 Since the emergency is 
so much more obvious now, I doubt that postmodern irony will 
get in the way. 
Finally, we should not minimize the difficulty of our 
task. There are no shortcuts. To our value-lacking world, Judge 
Posner offers pragmatism. But in our nihilism, pragmatism 
fares no better than any other position. Judge Posner can pro-
pose that judges “openly premise their decisions largely on 
common sense, a practical weighing of the relative costs and 
benefits of alternative decisions, [and] the relevant scientific and 
academic literature . . .,”125 but what is the relative cost of some-
thing like abortion? Thankfully, people can see the cost to a 
desperate, pregnant woman denied an abortion. But what is the 
other cost? That depends on whether the unborn child is a hu-
man being and on whether we count its interests in our calcu-
lus. In other words, one needs a real measure of human flour-
ishing before one can maximize welfare. Our inability to 
endorse valuations of real worth is our true problem. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
 123.  See PUTNAM, supra note 45, at 131: “The contemporary tendency to regard inter-
pretation as something second class reflects, I think, not a craving for objectivity but a craving 
for absolutes and a tendency . . . to think that if the absolute is unobtainable, then ‘anything 
goes.’” 
 124.  Obviously, this is just a quick reference. See generally Eric Sean Nelson, History as 
Decison and Event in Heidegger (2013), http://epub.ff.uns.ac.rs/index.php/arhe/article/viewFil
e/548/567. 
 125.  Richard A. Posner, What is Obviously Wrong with the Federal Judiciary, Yet Emi-
nently Curable: Part II, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 257, 261 (2016). 
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This essay should not be read as a criticism of conserva-
tive jurisprudence. On the left, John Hart Ely, presciently, in 
his 1980 Democracy and Distrust, understood our crisis and 
proposed a solution—to limit value judgments to process issues 
of political life.126 Ely understood that society no longer had the 
shared foundations to allow for substantive moral reasoning 
that would be viewed as legitimate. He made this point in set-
ting forth Phillip Roth’s story of the bus driver, which ends, 
“THEN THE OTHER FELLOW IS WRONG, IDIOT!”127 
Ely’s mistake was to accept the lack of shared founda-
tions and not question it. Indeed he praised it, saying that our 
society “rightly does not accept the notion of a discoverable and 
objectively valid set of moral principles, at least not a set that 
could plausibly serve to overturn the decisions of our elected 
representatives.”128 
This conclusion is not obvious. Brown, Loving and 
Skinner certainly throw it into question. So do cases protecting 
the equality of women. And Lawrence as well, just to begin the 
process of summing up cases. We now know how dangerous 
Ely’s conclusion is. When disagreement is allowed to limit 
truth, soon it can begin to undermine even factual claims. 
It is no longer 1980 or 1992. We know the world that 
the value skepticism of John Hart Ely and Antonin Scalia has 
given us. It is the world of 2017. Ely and Scalia have been 
judged right by the culture, but the consequence has been dis-
aster. We have to begin again and at least question whether 
they were right after all. Heidegger teaches that questioning is 
the piety of thought.129 We can’t expect piety in politics, but we 
can hope for it in law. 
 
 126.  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 127.  Id. at 48. 
 128.  Id. at 54. 
 129.  MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND 
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